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I present a logical argument for the existence of substantivalist spacetime: We should consider the 
account presented by Kant of spacetime as a genuine substance because it provides a plausible alternative 
to the widely held relationist viewpoint. I present several examples of enantiomorphic pairs, including 
the lowercase letters p and q to illustrate differences between such objects that have no apparent 
connection to the internal structure of each. These differences, I claim, must stem from a direct 
relationship between the objects and space itself. Furthermore, I examine the implications presented by 
enantiomorphic objects when time is taken to be the fourth dimension based on Einstein’s view of 





Most scientists and philosophers in recent years have agreed that space and time exist 
in some form, but opinions vary wildly as to its nature. Does it exist as an independent 
thing, a container within which all other objects fall? Or does it merely exist as a 
relation between objects? While this debate has existed since the early 18th century, the 
views held by contemporary scientists have changed little. The substantivalist position 
asserts that space is a thing that exists independently of objects. The relationist position 
in direct contrast maintains that space exists only as a mere relation between objects.   
 
Both views accept the existence of space; however relationists believe that space is 
directly dependent upon objects; if there were no objects in the universe, space would 
simply not exist. Space comes into existence when we begin referring to objects or 
possible objects. In referring to right, left, or other orientations in space we are 
referencing a space that merely exists through the relation between two or more objects. 
Substantivalists, on the other hand, believe that space clearly exists independently of 
objects as an object itself. If a universe existed in which there were no objects, space 
could still exist like an empty container. Immanuel Kant is one such philosopher who 
deemed it possible for space to exist independent of objects based upon a simple 
example involving a pair of gloves. He thoroughly examined the metaphysical 
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implications of earlier philosophers, and eventually ascribed to the substantivalist 
position.  
 
By first examining Kant’s original argument, then looking at the contemporary 
responses to it, I will identify the unstated assumptions as well as the implications 
inherent in each view; concluding that substantivalism is both a view that has 
maintained logical merit, and provided an interesting alternative to the increasingly 
popular relationist position. First I will evaluate the argument from the handedness of 
objects proposed by Kant, and expanded upon by Lawrence Sklar. I will then invoke 
the letters p and q as an equally effective alternative. Finally I will illustrate how Kant’s 
example is logically compatible with Albert Einstein’s theory of general relativity in 
order to illustrate that substantivalism is still a cogent hypothesis. 
 
 
Gloves as Enantiomorphs 
 
While a pair of gloves lying palm down side by side on a flat surface possess qualities 
that make them distinct objects, the exact differences are curiously difficult to 
articulate. Kant pointed to the structure of each glove, showing how the measurements 
and angles are exactly the same, simply appearing to be mirror images of each other. In 
doing so, he showed that though they appear identical; they are in fact very different. 
No matter which way the gloves were moved, they could not be made to appear 
oriented in the same way; this illustrates that even though a pair of gloves appear 
identical in structure, they are actually incongruent to one another. This incongruent 
quality can be applied not only to gloves, but also to the hands themselves.   
 
Congruence can be pictured by imagining two right isosceles triangles with sides of 
identical length both resting on a two-dimensional plane. The two triangles are 
congruent, because a rotation of one triangle can bring it into alignment so that it looks 
identical to the other. Congruence thus means that a continuous rigid motion (CRM) 
can bring two things which are oriented differently into a position in which they are 
identical in appearance; in the case of the triangle, a simple rotation (Sklar 236). 
 
In opposition to the term congruent is the phrase incongruent counterpart. This idea 
takes two shapes which are again identical in structure, however cannot be brought into 
congruence by a CRM. Take for instance the lowercase letters p and q. Both letters are 
structured in an identical manner on a two-dimensional surface with their only 
difference being position in relationship to space. The difference in this case from the 
congruent pair of triangles above, is that no rotation or two-dimensional movement of 
any kind will bring them into congruence. Likewise, the gloves mentioned above 
cannot be brought into congruence through any CRM in three-dimensional space. Even 
Res Cogitans (2011) 2                                                                                                          Hutchens | 3 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
inverting the gloves fails to bring them into congruence; thus Kant deems them to be an 
enantiomorphic pair, another term for a pair of incongruent counterparts. 
 
Kant’s inquiry into the handedness of gloves was for the purpose of determining 
whether or not right or left-handedness could be determined by some relational 
property of the gloves themselves, or whether or not an external substance known as 
space would have to be utilized to account for the obvious spatial difference between 
the two. His account ultimately found that space was a necessary prerequisite to explain 
the difference between the two objects. Kant insisted that because the pair of gloves is 
identical in structure and cannot be brought in congruence, that the only way to 
reference them individually as a right or left-handed glove in a universe in which the 
gloves were the only thing in existence, is through a reference to space itself (Sklar 
235).  
 
Other philosophers responded, claiming that there was in fact a way to distinguish the 
two gloves; through a reference to the internal features of one of the gloves.1 By 
examining each and recognizing that on the right-handed glove the thumb is at a 45 
degree angle to the left of the palm and that on the left-handed glove the thumb was at a 
45 degree angle to the right of the palm they could tell which glove was right and which 
glove was left without having to reference the counterpart. 
 
The problem with this is that in order to consider something right-handed or left-handed 
in the truest sense, its handedness must be preserved regardless of its orientation. In the 
case of the gloves, they must have the property of being right-handed or left-handed 
whether the palm of the glove is facing toward an observer or away. In this example, 
there is no way to discern whether or not a single glove is right or left-handed; if the 
observer merely changed position so that they were looking at the opposite side of the 
glove, their perception of the handedness of the glove would change. However this does 
not preclude the existence of handedness; rather it is impossible to imagine a glove or 
hand that exists without the property of handedness. Both sides of the debate 
acknowledge that this characteristic exists. As a result, the existence of an observer is 
inadequate to explain the apparent handedness.  
 
Kant reasoned that without some way of using an external factor to determine whether 
or not a glove is right or left-handed, there would have to be some intrinsic difference 
within the glove to account for handedness. He assumed that handedness was not a 
                                               
1
 By examining the relation of the internal parts of each glove individually, some philosophers came to 
the conclusion that “handedness” is a property intrinsic to each glove (Sklar 235). 
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feature about a glove that could be changed along with the gloves’ orientation; and as 
such no intrinsic feature of the glove was sufficient to explain the difference. The 
relationship of the thumb with regard to the rest of the glove is irrelevant; if the glove 
was turned so that that palm faced away from you the glove would appear to switch 
handedness, which Kant asserts cannot happen (Sklar 237).  
 
The same can be said for the p and q example. Without any reference point to 
determine how the letters should be viewed directionally, how could one determine 
whether they were viewing a p or a q? It would be impossible. Yet there is a fact of the 
matter. To better imagine this, picture both the p and the q drawn on a window. From 
inside the window one would appear as a p and one as a q. From the outside the effect 
would be reversed. Without some element of space determining the perspective by 
which the objects should be viewed, there is no viable way to tell the difference; and 
yet we know that there is in fact a difference between the two objects. 
 
Stick Figures and Facings 
 
When another pair of objects with defined facings exists within the context of 
surrounding objects, their orientation remains no less mysterious. Imagine two stick 
figures with no faces; one of the stick figures is facing toward an observer, and the 
other is facing away. How would one go about determining which stick figure was 
facing which direction? This thought experiment created by John Koolage follows the 
same process as with the p and q example. We know that there is a fact of the matter 
that one is facing the observer and the other is facing away. We also understand that 
there is some intrinsic difference between the two objects, because although they 
appear identical, there are in fact two separate objects by stipulation.   
 
The relationists would say that provided space exists objectively we should be able to 
discern which is facing toward and which is facing away. Of course, there are no 
distinguishing features to hint as to which is which, and the knowledge of which is to 
the right and which is to the left of the other is not helpful in answering this question. 
The relationists rightly conclude that according to that definition of space, the 
orientation of each stick figure is impossible to determine. That being the case, they 
make the jump to assuming that space cannot exist within the realm of objective reality. 
However, they make the jump based on the assumption that for space to exist, the 
orientation must be discernable by an observer. Substantivalists claim that space can 
exist and give objects a specific orientation, even if the true orientation is inherently 
unknowable; as a result this determination by no means makes or breaks the 
substantivalist viewpoint.  
 
The relationists seem keen on declaring based upon this argument that space does not 
exist except as a mere relation between objects. However this conception is misguided 
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at best. Their argument essentially begins to fall apart before it even fully forms 
because there is an unstated assumption made at the very beginning of this thought 
experiment. By claiming that p and q both have a specific identity and claiming that the 
stick people do in fact have a specific orientation, they are unwittingly accepting the 
idea that there is objective and independently existing space to begin with.   
 
Objective space in this sense is evidenced by the fact that even though both stick 
figures appear identical, they are not the same, because they both occupy different 
points and have different orientations with regard to space. Essentially, the relationists 
attempted to illustrate the inadequacy of the substantivalist viewpoint by attempting to 
argue the idea that even objective independent space does not provide the ability to 
identify orientation of objects in relation to itself. However, this implies that there is a 
definite directionality; which implies the existence of spacetime. In effect, the 
relationists are assuming that the objective view of spacetime they were trying to 
disprove actually exists for their argument to work correctly. 
 
 
A Relationist Response 
 
One argument for the relationist view of space is that there are in fact no such things as 
incongruent counterparts. While this may sound far-fetched, at face value they make an 
interesting point. There is an aspect of observation that can have a definite effect of the 
appearance of congruity. Lawrence Sklar used the example of a circle with one line 
outside of it and one line drawn inside.2 While it is impossible to move the line outside 
of the circle to an interior position without crossing the edge of the circle and without 
moving it in a CRM that breaks the two-dimensional plane, he illustrates that this by 
adding a third dimension, it becomes easy to reconcile (Sklar 238). By changing 
perspective and moving to the far edge of the paper, viewing the shape at an extreme 
angle, it is impossible to make the exterior line appear as though it lies within the 
bounds of the circle. However in three-dimensions a CRM can easily move the line 
outward and into the circle. In this way Sklar posits that it may be possible to bring 
incongruent counterparts into congruence by merely considering a higher dimension 
(Sklar 238). 
While this is interesting in theory, it becomes much more difficult to fathom with three-
dimensional objects. Because with the two-dimensional example a three-dimensional 
perspective change is necessary to view the shape with both lines inside the circle, to do 
                                               
2
 Lawrence Sklar’s Depiction of a circle where the exterior line cannot be moved to the interior 
of the circle without breaking the two-dimensional plane (Sklar 238) 
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the same to a three-dimensional incongruent counterpart would involve some sort of 
four dimensional perspective. The fourth dimension, which is considered to be time 
according to Einstein’s theories of general and special relativity, must have some 
property by which we can move the object into congruence through a valid CRM if this 
theory is to hold. 
 
Unfortunately, the concept of being able to shift one’s seemingly fixed position in time 
in order to view three-dimensional enantiomorphic pairs in such a way that they appear 
to attain some form of congruency is to me unrealistic. If the fourth dimension is time, 
there is no apparent way to move the objects according to any CRM and have them 
appear congruent. The object would have to change its position with regard to time in 
some way in order for this to occur. Things that can be easily demonstrated in two-
dimensions frequently fail to hold to the same principles in three and four dimensions. 
Unless a valid example can be given to illustrate that such a shift can and does actually 
occur, there is no reason to accept one two-dimensional simplified example as the 
lynchpin upon which one should build their entire viewpoint regarding the nature of 
space and time.  
 
Indeed, if one appealed to this sort of argument to prove their position it could simply 
be reversed. In two-dimensional space the p and q which are enantiomorphs would 
appear merely as identical lines.  Appearing congruent from a 2D perspective 
ultimately has no bearing on whether or not the shapes are actually congruent. If we 
were to begin looking in higher dimensions such as the third and fourth for congruency, 
we may be just as likely to find even more instances of incongruent counterparts. 
Without any real opposition to the existence of incongruent counterparts otherwise 
known as enantiomorphic pairs, we can safely assume that these pairs do in fact exist in 
reality beyond mere abstraction. Evidence of pairs such as gloves and letters provide 
tangible evidence for this idea.   
 
 
Reductionism and the Third Reference Point  
 
Reductionism asserts that space and time are mere conventions; that they do not exist in 
objective reality. If space and time are merely a convenient way of speaking, then there 
would be no potential for enantiomorphic objects to exist. This is because without a 
tangible difference between the two objects, there would be no way to differentiate 
them from one another. According to the laws of logic, two things by definition cannot 
be one thing; and thus there must be some difference, whether it is their location in 
space or their orientation. In the case of enantiomophs that difference must be in 
relation to the object’s orientation; one glove is right-handed because it is oriented 
differently than the other. Which is entitled right-handed and which left-handed does 
not actually make a difference. The fact of the matter remains, that there is a difference 
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beyond what term we use. Thus, the substantivalist will assert that space exists. The 
nature of that space however, still has the potential to be debated between the remaining 
viable views: relationism and substantivalism. 
 
If space exists, and if two incongruent counterparts such as p and q exist in a plane, we 
should be able to tell which is which through a reference to space itself. The question 
with this premise arises with the use of the word “space.” There are two possible 
definitions of space that we are considering. The first is the view held by the 
substantivalists, or objective space. The second, space relative to the relation between 
objects, or relationist space. 
 
If we assume space is merely relationist and apply this idea, then we end up with an 
altogether different response than that of a substantivalist. The relationist view sees the 
enantiomorphic objects as creating space through their relationship to each other. If this 
is the case and there is no objective space except the relation between objects then the 
orientation of the objects cannot be defined; thus p and q to the relationist remain 
undetermined without some third reference point.  Essentially, this example is the same 
as when p and q were written on a glass window; from different perspectives it is 
always possible to differentiate two objects, but impossible to tell which is p and which 
is q without some third reference point.   
 
Why is it important that we are able to discern the difference between the two objects in 
the first place? Because if we are able to distinguish a difference between the two, then 
some trait external to their structure has to determine which shape is which; barring the 
existence of some obscure intrinsic property that remains unknown to us. Proving a 
definite property, whether internal or external, that differentiates the shapes would 
provide compelling evidence for the idea that space exists as an external independent 
substance.  
 
While the relationists are convinced that the substantivalists cannot discern between the 
two shapes either, the substantivalists are convinced that the concept of objectively 
existing space is a necessary prerequisite of the entire argument to begin with. The 
substantivalist view actually works quite well with the scenario of the indefinable p and 
q. With orientation defined, we know the proper perspective by which we should be 
examining the two shapes; it is quite easily to tell the difference between the letter p 
and the letter q. In fact, it’s virtually identical to simply reading the letters off this page.   
 
Without some sort of third reference point, the relationists cannot determine which way 
the letters should be examined and thus cannot tell the difference between the two. The 
substantivalists, on the other hand, have the third reference point built in; “space” itself.  
The substantivalist perspective seems to provide the third reference point by which we 
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are able to ascertain the proper orientation and perspective, thus having the ability to 
determine which the identity of each letter, both p and q. 
 
While the substantivalists would be content to stop here, the relationists continue with 
their argument. They claim that because the orientation of p and q cannot be determined 
the identity of each letter remains unknown. If we assume that we can only use the 
letters themselves to determine which is which, and their structure is identical, we have 
no way of ascertaining the difference. Because of this the relationist is faced with quite 
a problem.  
 
With no way to bring the shapes into congruence via a CRM and show that incongruent 
counterparts do not in fact exist, and without a way to differentiate the shapes from 
each other except with regard to their orientation; they must claim that which is the 
letter p and which is the letter q is inherently unknowable without some third object. 
Internal directionality fails to ascertain which is which, because the moment the 
perspective is changed the perception of which shape is which changes with it. The 
problem with this idea is that the relationists are utilizing their own concept and 
definition of space for the purpose of determining the validity of the substantivalist 
viewpoint. This does not work because utilizing the substantivalist view of time 
including the concept of the third reference point the identity of which letter is which is 
easily ascertained.  
 
In this way, space appears to be an irreducible concept; we cannot refer to any object 
without referring to its position with regard to space. Time functions in much the same 
way. We cannot make references to any particular thing or object without referencing it 
within the paradigm of time. Whether past, present, or future, the tense with regard to 
time is just as vital as its position in three-dimensional space. Because of this, I am 
inclined to pair time as the fourth dimension in addition to the three-dimensional space 
as spacetime. While time adds another level of complexity to traditional 3D space, it 
provides an interesting change in possibilities for reference point changes in such 
thought experiments. Many contemporary scientists and philosophers have wrestled 
with these ideas and believe that the concept of spacetime based on both thought 
experiments and physical research; however the details of those inquiries are best left to 
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